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CASE NOTE
BUSINESS LAW—The Hall Street Hangover: Recovering and Discovering
Avenues for Review of Arbitration Awards; Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc.,
128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008)
Codie Henderson*

INTRODUCTION
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) under its
Commerce Clause power in order to make arbitration clauses just as enforceable
as other common contract provisions.1 The FAA has sixteen sections, but only
three will be important for this study: §§ 9, 10, and 11. When the FAA is the
controlling law, § 9 allows a party who is victorious in arbitration to seek judicial
enforcement of the arbitration award within one year of the arbitrator’s decision.2
When entering judgment on the award, “the court must grant such an order
unless the award is vacated, modiﬁed, or corrected as prescribed in sections ten
and eleven.”3 Section 10 allows a court to vacate an award if the arbitrator made
one of four errors.4 Whether these four errors, coupled with three opportunities
in § 11 to modify or correct an award, are the exclusive instances when a court
may alter an arbitration decision became the epicenter of Hall Street Associates v.
Mattel, Inc.5

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2011. I would like to thank my family,
friends, and professors for their encouragement and unwavering support. I would also like to thank
the members of the Wyoming Law Review Board for their guidance throughout this project.
1
Cynthia A. Murray, Contractual Expansion of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 633, 635 (2002) (quoting AlliedBruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270–71 (1995)).
2
Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 3, Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396
(2008) (No. 06-989), 2007 WL 2731409 [hereinafter Respondent].
3

9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006).

4

9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006). A court may vacate an arbitration award under the FAA in four
instances:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2)
where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufﬁcient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, ﬁnal, and deﬁnite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
Id.
5

128 S. Ct. at 1401.
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The dispute that gave rise to this litigation emerged from a simple rental
agreement between landlord (Hall Street) and tenant (Mattel).6 The lease
stipulated the tenant must indemnify the landlord for any costs resulting from
a violation of environmental law.7 In 1998, testing discovered high levels of
contamination in the leased property’s well water.8 When Mattel attempted to
vacate the property and terminate the lease, Hall Street sought indemniﬁcation
from Mattel for contamination clean up costs.9 At trial, Mattel emerged victorious
on the termination issue but agreed to arbitrate the indemniﬁcation claim.10
Again, the result was for Mattel.11
The parties’ arbitration agreement gave the district court power to vacate the
arbitration award if the arbitrator committed legal error.12 Legal error, however,
is not an established standard of review within the FAA.13 Thus, this was a
nonstatutory—contract-based—ground for review.14 Twice the district court
vacated or modiﬁed the arbitration award based on party motions by invoking
the parties’ nonstatutory standard of review.15 On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declared the award should be conﬁrmed unless
there were grounds for vacating or modifying the award in §§ 10 and 11 of the
FAA.16
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit, holding
that §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA provide the exclusive grounds for modifying or
vacating an arbitration award.17 Ostensibly, this decision precludes nonstatutory

6

Id. at 1400.

7

Id. The lease stated Mattel was also responsible for its predecessor’s environmental
violations. Id.
8
Id. The main contaminant that was the impetus of Mattel’s environmental violation was
trichloroethylene (TCE). Id. Mattel’s predecessors, the GAF Corporation and Sawyers, Inc., used
TCE as a degreaser until 1981. Respondent, supra note 2, at 4. They disposed of the degreaser waste
through the use of a septic tank and a drain ﬁeld, both of which were on the property. Id.
9

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1400. Arbitration was not the party’s ﬁrst choice. Id. They ﬁrst
attempted mediation, but when that failed the parties drafted an arbitration agreement. Id. The
agreement was not a part of the original contract. See id.
10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id. at 1404–05.

14

See id. at 1400–01 (alluding to the dispute between FAA review standards and those based
in contract).
15

Respondent, supra note 2, at 11–12.

16

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1401 (citing Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc.,
341 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2003)).
17

Alan Scott Rau, Fear of Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 469, 471–72 (2006).
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grounds of review.18 However, despite appearances, Hall Street may not have
completely eliminated opportunities for contract drafters to expand beyond the
FAA.19
This case note argues the Supreme Court correctly decided Hall Street on the
whole, but grounds for review—outside of the FAA—may still exist.20 First, this
note discusses why the decision is correct in light of the purposes of litigation and
arbitration.21 Second, is an explanation of how this decision fulﬁlls the historical
goals of the FAA.22 Third, is a search for viable nonstatutory grounds of review
in order to give practitioners a list courts may accept.23 Finally, this note explores
alternatives to using nonstatutory grounds of review for those who desire a method
of appealing an arbitration award that does not tread near Hall Street.24

BACKGROUND
Mere decades ago arbitration clauses were common only in contracts
involving construction and labor agreements; however, today such clauses
seem ubiquitous.25 Early courts did not deem arbitration a suitable alternative
to litigation until 1925.26 These courts viewed arbitration as a threat to judicial
power and often refused to acknowledge contractual agreements to arbitrate.27
Courts used theories, such as the “revocability doctrine” to dismiss arbitration
agreements on the rationale that arbitrators were partisans loyal only to the party
who chose them.28 Thus, by appearing concerned for justice, courts rationalized
their hostility for arbitration by masking it in benevolence.29 However, arbitration’s

18
Jon Polenberg & Quinn Smith, Can Parties Play Games with Arbitration Awards? How
Mattel May Put an End to Prolonged Gamesmanship, 83 FLA. B.J. 36, 36 (2009).
19

See infra note 91 and accompanying text.

20

See infra notes 89–94 and accompanying text.

21

See infra notes 95–120 and accompanying text.

22

See infra notes 121–30 and accompanying text.

23

See infra notes 131–67 and accompanying text.

24

See infra notes 168–75 and accompanying text.

25

Kenneth F. Dunham, Binding Arbitration and Speciﬁc Performance Under the FAA: Will This
Marriage of Convenience Survive?, 3 J. AM. ARB. 187, 188–89 (2004).
26
Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Deﬁning Arbitration’s Finality Through Functional
Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 137–38 (2002).
27

Id.; see also Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120–21 (1924) (noting courts
previously declined to enforce arbitration agreements).
28

Schmitz, supra note 26, at 138.

29

Id.
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potential as an expedient, cost-effective, and private means of dispute resolution
soon caught on, and a reform movement spawned in the early 1900s.30 The
movement culminated with the passage of the FAA in 1925.31
The precursors to the FAA are found in the 1920 New York Act, which has
been coined the “nation’s ﬁrst ‘modern’ arbitration statute.”32 In fact, sections of
the FAA came directly from the New York Act.33 One of the hallmarks of the
New York Act is that it advocated limited judicial review.34 In contrast to the
New York Act was the Illinois Arbitration Statute, preceding the New York Act
by three years.35 The 1917 Illinois statute allowed for broad judicial review and
court interference when arbitration did occur.36 During the reform movement
eventually leading to the FAA, Congress recognized two conﬂicting approaches
to judicial review.37 On one hand, it could have chosen the Illinois model that
sanctioned judicial interference in every step of the arbitration process, including
review of awards.38 Alternatively, it could have chosen the New York approach
that buttressed the reform movement’s objective of creating a method of dispute
resolution insulated from “judicial second-guessing.”39 Congress settled on the
New York tenet of limited review as its framework; however, which proposition
the FAA stood for was not always clear to courts.40
Up until Hall Street, many courts accepted nonstatutory standards of review
for arbitration awards.41 These standards included review when an award was
30

Brief for United States Council for International Business as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 6–7, Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008) (No. 06-989), 2007
WL 2707883 [hereinafter International Business].
31

Id.

Id. (citing IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION—NATIONALIZATION—
INTERNATIONALIZATION 34–37, 84–88 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992)).
32

33

Id. at 8; see N.Y. LAW § 7511 (McKinney 1920).

34

International Business, supra note 30, at 8.

35

Id.; see 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12 (1917).

36

International Business, supra note 30, at 8.

37

Bradley T. King, “Through Fault of Their Own”—Applying Bonner Mall’s Extraordinary
Circumstances Test to Heightened Standard of Review Clauses, 45 B.C. L. REV. 943, 955–56 (2004)
(indicating the presence of two conﬂicting statutes).
38

Id. (noting the Illinois statute conﬂicted with the New York Act’s limited review procedure).

39

Id. at 956.

40

See generally Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration After Hall Street v. Mattel: What Happens Next?,
31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 273, 283 (2009). Prior to Hall Street, two inconsistent views of
the FAA proliferated. Id. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits refused contractual expansion of review for
arbitration awards while the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits approved expansion. Id.
Thus, Hall Street can be viewed as the attempted resolution of the circuit splits and court confusion
regarding FAA application. See id. at 288–97.
41

See Polenberg & Smith, supra note 18, at 36 (“[Hall Street] challenged long-held notions
about the available standards of review governing arbitration awards.”) (emphasis added).
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arbitrary and capricious, completely irrational, or when the arbitrator disregarded
the essence of the party’s contract.42 An award could also be overturned if it
manifestly disregarded the law or violated public policy.43 Many nonstatutory
standards of review can be traced back to one United States Supreme Court
case: Wilko v. Swan.44 Wilko referenced the term “manifest disregard” of the
law as a nonstatutory standard of review, but never accurately deﬁned it.45 This
ambiguity left the door open for parties to create nonstatutory grounds for review
while leaving courts in limbo regarding whether nonstatutory grounds could be
upheld.46
While many seized upon Wilko’s vague “manifest disregard” of the law
standard to validate nonstatutory standards of review, another more conservative
line of thought developed foreshadowing the Hall Street decision.47 In Bowen v.
Amoco Pipeline Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
stated its ability to review an arbitration award was extremely limited; in fact, the
court believed it to be one of the narrowest review standards in the law.48 The court

42

See, e.g., Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1134 (3d Cir. 1972)
(noting an award may be set aside if it is completely irrational); Van Horn v. Van Horn, 393 F. Supp.
2d 730, 746 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (listing arbitrary and capricious as an accepted standard of review);
Evans Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Co., No. Civ.A. 01-0051, 2004 WL 241701, at *5 (E.D. La.
Feb. 6, 2004) (recognizing an arbitration award can be vacated if it fails to draw its essence from the
contract).
43

See, e.g., Saroﬁm v. Trust Co. of the W., 440 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 2006) (clarifying an
arbitration award may be vacated when it is contrary to public policy); Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local
Union No. 1269, 896 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1990) (declaring “manifest disregard” of the law is an
accepted standard of review).
44

Polenberg & Smith, supra note 18, at 36 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37

(1953)).
45

See 346 U.S. at 436–37.

46

Leasure, supra note 40, at 283. Some amiable appellate courts believed expanded review was
acceptable. Id. In Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995),
the Fifth Circuit declared judicial review for errors of law would be permitted because arbitration, at
its core, is a facet of contract where private parties’ wishes should not be circumvented by a policy in
favor of arbitration. See Leasure, supra note 40, at 289 (citing Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996). Moreover,
the Fifth Circuit noted the FAA may not prevent parties from creating standards of review that
fall outside of the FAA. Id. at 289–90 (quoting Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996). To do so would be
contrary to the FAA’s purpose of guaranteeing arbitration agreements are enforced as the parties
agreed. See, e.g., Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding
nonstatutory grounds for review of arbitration awards is in agreement with the purpose of the FAA).
Courts reaching these decisions usually found a party’s freedom to contract trumped limited review.
Leasure, supra note 40, at 288. The First Circuit followed a similar line of thinking. See P.R. Tel. Co.
v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that even if following the FAA
provided a more efﬁcient means of resolving disputes, enforcing party’s agreements would still be
more important).
47

Murray, supra note 1, at 633.

48

254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d
1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1995)).
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believed narrow review standards were essential if arbitration was to maintain its
virtue as an economical and expeditious method of dispute resolution.49 Staying
steadfast in its belief, the Tenth Circuit declared, except for a few judicially created
exceptions, the FAA provided the only grounds for review.50 Support for the
Bowen decision came from the court’s belief that if review standards outside of the
FAA were forced upon courts, private parties would be impermissibly modifying
the judicial process.51 The court also based this conclusion on its recognition
of a Supreme Court decision allowing parties to dictate how arbitration was
administered, but precluding provisions requiring courts to review awards for
defects not listed in the FAA.52
The Tenth Circuit was not alone in its holding that the FAA provides the
exclusive grounds for review of arbitration awards. In Kyocera Corp. v. PrudentialBache Trade Services, Inc., the Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion.53
Moreover, in similar fashion to the Supreme Court in Hall Street, the Ninth
Circuit cited efﬁciency, ﬂexibility, informality, and simplicity as determinative
factors.54 Thus, while one line of thinking advocated expanded judicial review
by purporting to defend freedom of contract from attack, the other analyzed the
repercussions of expanded review and reached a conclusion vindicated by Hall
Street.55

PRINCIPAL CASE
Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc. presented the question of whether parties
could draft an arbitration agreement allowing a court to review an arbitration
award for errors of law.56 However, in a broader sense, the question was whether
the FAA provided the exclusive grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award, or

49

See id.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 933.

52

Leasure, supra note 40, at 284 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479

(1989)).
53
341 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The [FAA] enumerates limited grounds on which a
federal court may vacate, modify, or correct an arbitral award. Neither erroneous legal conclusions
nor unsubstantiated factual ﬁndings justify federal court review of an arbitral award under the
statute, which is unambiguous in this regard.”).
54

Id. at 998–1000.

55

See Leasure, supra note 40, at 283. The development of nonstatutory standards of review
began after Wilko and continued until Hall Street was decided. See Polenberg & Smith, supra note
18, at 36–37. This was also the period where different lines of thinking developed between the
federal circuit courts necessitating the granting of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.
See Leasure, supra note 40, at 283.
56
Polenberg & Smith, supra note 18, at 36; see Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
1396, 1404 (2008).
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whether a private party could contractually add review standards not contained in
the FAA.57
The original reason for ﬁling suit in Hall Street bears little resemblance
to the protracted case it became. Originally, the dispute centered on Mattel’s
ability to terminate a lease agreement and whether, upon termination, Mattel
must indemnify Hall Street for violations of environmental law by previous
tenants.58 When litigation in the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon failed to resolve the indemniﬁcation question, the parties resorted to
arbitration.59 The arbitration agreement provided that “the [c]ourt shall vacate,
modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s ﬁndings of facts are not
supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator’s conclusions of
law are erroneous.”60 After arbitration rendered an award in favor of Mattel, Hall
Street made a motion in district court to vacate or modify the award.61 The court
invoked the standard of review contracted for by the parties and vacated the
award.62 Citing LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., the court held parties
can create nonstatutory grounds for review.63 On remand, the arbitrator found for
Hall Street.64 Both parties then sought modiﬁcation under the agreement’s review
standards; however, only interest calculations were changed.65 Both parties then
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.66
The Ninth Circuit had recently overruled LaPine in Kyocera Corp. v.
Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc.67 As a result, Mattel altered its argument to
57
Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1400. Although one standard of review caused the controversy, the
Court expanded the issue to consider the exclusivity of the FAA instead of focusing on the party’s
review standard speciﬁcally. Id. at 1401.
58

Id. at 1400.

59

Id. The parties also attempted to mediate the indemniﬁcation claim, however, when that
too was unsuccessful they resorted to arbitration. Id.
60

Id. at 1400–01.

61

Id. at 1401.

62

Id. The standard of review contracted for contained “errors of law,” and it was on this
basis the court remanded to the arbitrator. Id. The original contract provided for indemniﬁcation
if either Mattel or its predecessors violated Oregon environmental law. Id. at 1400. The high levels
of chemical contamination found in the property’s well water violated the Oregon Drinking Water
Quality Act; however, the arbitrator’s original decision was that the water quality act was not
applicable environmental law. Id. at 1401.
63
130 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1997). LaPine Tech. was the ﬁrst decision of three. See Leasure,
supra note 40, at 286–88. In this case, the Ninth Circuit found expanded judicial review preferable;
however, it later overruled this case in the third and ﬁnal decision. Id.
64
Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1401. On remand, the arbitrator concluded the Oregon Drinking
Water Quality Act was an environmental law. Id.
65

Id.

66

Id.

67

341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003).
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reﬂect the ruling and contended legal error was no longer an enforceable judicial
review standard.68 The Ninth Circuit then reversed in favor of Mattel.69 The
district court, on remand, found for Hall Street again and the Ninth Circuit
again reversed.70 The United States Supreme Court ﬁnally granted certiorari to
ultimately resolve the issue.71

Majority Opinion
The Court reached its 6 to 3 decision by initially explaining that the FAA’s
purpose was to give arbitration agreements the same enforceability as other
contract provisions.72 However, the Court acknowledged uncertainty as to
what extent review standards for arbitration awards were also enforceable.73 The
resulting issue is typically whether grounds for vacating or modifying an award are
limited or expansive.74 With this in mind, the Court addressed Hall Street’s efforts
to demonstrate the FAA was not exclusive.75 As expected, Hall Street focused on
Wilko to establish the acceptance of nonstatutory grounds for review.76 The Court,
however, clariﬁed that while Wilko may support the proposition that courts can
expand judicial review when necessary, Wilko does not support an inference that
private parties can do the same.77 Moreover, a close reading of Wilko seems to
reject general judicial review of awards.78

68

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1401.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id. at 1402. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito and Scalia,
made up the majority. Id. at 1399. Justices Stevens and Breyer both ﬁled dissenting opinions, while
Justice Kennedy joined in Justice Stevens’s dissent. Id.
73
Id. at 1403 (“The Courts of Appeals have split over the exclusiveness of these statutory
grounds when parties take the FAA shortcut to conﬁrm, vacate, or modify an award, with some
saying the recitations are exclusive, and others regarding them as mere threshold provisions open to
expansion by agreement.”).
74

See id.

75

Id.

76

Id. (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953)). Hall Street claimed that Wilko
established “manifest disregard” of the law as grounds for judicial review. Id. Many courts believed
Wilko stood for this proposition and Hall Street used these cases as ammunition for its argument.
See, e.g., McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2006); Hoeft v. MVL
Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003).
77

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1404.

78

Id. Hall Street purported that Wilko implicitly sanctioned standards of review outside of
the FAA. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 13–14, Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396 (No. 06-989), 2007
WL 2197585. However, while Wilko did use the term manifest disregard, the Court rejected the
idea that it was a standard of review in federal courts. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436–37. Thus, the Court
in Hall Street failed to believe general review was permissible given the context and disapproval in
Wilko. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1398–99.
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Central to the Court’s holding was its conclusion that the policy of enforcing
arbitration agreements can only go as far as the textual elements of the FAA
allow.79 The Court was mindful of the enforcement policy but concluded the
FAA text gives no hint of ﬂexibility.80 Speciﬁcally, the Court was persuaded by the
FAA’s provision declaring a court “must grant” an order conﬁrming an arbitration
“unless” review is warranted under §§ 10 through 11.81 Thus, any agreement
allowing for expanded judicial review appeared at odds with the text of the FAA.82
The Court concluded this point by clarifying that parties should not ﬁght the
FAA text and instead should recognize a “national policy favoring arbitration
with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of
resolving disputes straightaway.”83 The review standards, of course, were only
those enumerated in §§ 10 through 11 of the FAA.84

Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens ﬁled a dissent, with which Justice Kennedy joined and Justice
Breyer agreed.85 The dissent concluded if the policy behind the FAA is truly to
encourage enforcement of agreements to arbitrate then the clearly expressed
intentions of the parties should be honored.86 This point was highlighted when
Justice Stevens declared the FAA should be a “shield meant to protect parties from
hostile courts, not a sword with which to cut down parties’ . . . agreements to
arbitrate.”87 Moreover, if a subsidiary purpose of the FAA is to encourage use of
arbitration then courts should not refuse to honor valid and negotiated arbitration
agreements for fear of undermining this purpose.88

ANALYSIS
In Hall Street, the United States Supreme Court correctly concluded that
judicial review of arbitration awards should be limited to situations listed in the
FAA.89 Any other conclusion would undermine the fundamental qualities of
79

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1405.

80

Id.

81

Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000)).

82

Id. The Court also rejected an argument that the FAA was a default statute parties could
use when the agreement did not provide the review standards. Id. The Court supplemented this
conclusion by providing an example of what a ﬂexible, default provision would look like. Id.
83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id. at 1408 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

86

Id. at 1408–09. Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion merely cited the same points found in
Justice Stevens’s dissent. See id. at 1410 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87

Id. at 1409 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

88

Id.

89

See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2010

9

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 10 [2010], No. 1, Art. 12

308

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10

arbitration, as well as blur the line between arbitration and litigation.90 Although
the Court reached the correct holding, the decision is not as decisive as it may
appear at ﬁrst blush. Late in the opinion, the Court declared that perhaps there
could be other “more searching [grounds for] review based on authority outside
the statute.”91 Thus, while Hall Street seems to limit judicial review to grounds
listed in the FAA, it appears there is still opportunity to seek judicial review on a
nonstatutory basis.
In reaching its decision, the United States Supreme Court concerned itself
with whether letting parties expand the grounds for judicial review would make
arbitration a prelude to litigation.92 If parties were able to contract for a court
to review the award for any possible error occurring during arbitration, then
judicial review would almost certainly follow arbitration as a means of escaping
an unfavorable ruling.93 However, it appears that not only would arbitration be a
prelude to litigation, but the line between the two may become blurred, resulting
in increased demand on courts and arbitrators alike.94

Impacts of an Alternative Holding
If parties were free to weave a tapestry of various grounds for judicial review,
courts would be forced to undergo a time consuming review of a case’s merits.95
This could result in arbitration becoming the ﬁrst stage of a trial and district
courts becoming appellate divisions.96 Aside from the obvious fact that docket
loads could also increase, review of arbitration cases would be difﬁcult due to
the dissimilarity between litigation and arbitration.97 As one commentator put
it, “arbitration and litigation are fundamentally different games played according
90

See infra notes 95–120 and accompanying text.

91

Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1406 (2008).

92

Id. at 1405.

93

See David W. Rivkin & Eric P. Tuchmann, Protecting Both the FAA and Party Autonomy: The
Hall Street Decision, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 537, 540–41 (2006).
94

Id.

95

Id.; see also Hans Smit, Contractual Modiﬁcation of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral
Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147, 150 (1997) (postulating parties’ vast ability to shape the
arbitration process decreases the need for judicial review, thus saving precious judicial resources).
96
See Rivkin & Tuchmann, supra note 93, at 540–41. Making district courts a type of
appellate court would be a burden, as the district courts’ traditional role is merely to afﬁrm an
arbitration award expediently. See id. at 541.
97
International Business, supra note 30, at 17. Litigation has stricter rules of evidence and
more rigid rules of procedure compared with arbitration. See Rivkin & Tuchmann, supra note 93,
at 541. Because litigation and arbitration are so different, reviewing courts may have little idea from
the record, if a record even exists, as to what actually occurred during arbitration. See Schmitz, supra
note 26, at 192–95 (“[I]n most cases such [judicial] review [of arbitration awards] is awkward and
unrealistic because the arbitration record and opinion will not be sufﬁcient for a court’s substantive
review.”).
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to different rules.”98 Courts would be forced to reconstruct cases using rules they
are unfamiliar with, possibly resulting in a skewed interpretation by the judge.99
However, by limiting judicial review to certain grounds in the FAA, courts will
be aware of what standard they are to use instead of being subject to any creative
standard a party can fathom.100
If any nonstatutory grounds for review were permissible, arbitrators, like
courts, would also be forced into unfamiliar territory. For example, arbitrators
may adopt stricter rules of evidence, hoping that if a party appealed the decision it
would withstand judicial scrutiny.101 Arbitration’s ﬂexibility would be undermined
by rigid procedure markedly like litigation, resulting in a prolonged dispute that
contravenes the fundamental purpose of arbitration.102
Congress’s goal of making arbitration quick and cost effective would also
be frustrated if the Court held in favor of Hall Street.103 One of the principle
features of arbitration is that the time needed to resolve a dispute is substantially
shorter than litigation.104 While cases awaiting trial may be prolonged for years,
parties submitting to arbitration can often times have their case resolved within a
month.105
Shortening the time a dispute is pending should result in parties saving
money.106 The Supreme Court has previously recognized that arbitration is
effective as a means of reducing the expenses of litigation usually associated with

98

Schmitz, supra note 26, at 193.

99

See International Business, supra note 30, at 17–18 (arguing courts will be substantially
burdened if forced to use unfamiliar rules, reconstruct an arbitrator’s ﬁnding of facts, and discern
the arbitrator’s legal reasoning years after arbitration took place).
100
See Schmitz, supra note 26, at 190, 195 (noting expanded review would give the courts
unexpected work and authority that was not speciﬁcally assigned to them by the legislature under
the FAA).
101
Rivkin & Tuchmann, supra note 93, at 541 (declaring arbitrators would feel compelled to
judicialize their procedures given the likelihood of judicial review).
102

Id.

103

Brief for American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
8–9, Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. 1396 (No. 06-989), 2007 WL 2707884. One of the principle problems
with typical litigation is the time it takes to get a case heard by the courts. Leon Sarpy, Arbitration
as a Means of Reducing Court Congestion, 41 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 182, 188–89 (1965–1966).
104

Sarpy, supra note 103, at 188–89.

105

Id.; see also Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical
Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 403 (2002) (noting statistics support the
proposition that arbitration resolves disputes within a year while litigation averages two and onehalf years).
106
Sarpy, supra note 103, at 189. Lawyers’ fees are often the most recognized savings, as the
shorter the dispute, the less time clients are charged. Id. Private arbitration also has another advantage
because it does not involve a public venue where resolving disputes becomes plagued by bailiff and
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prolonged disputes.107 Moreover, if the parties to a dispute are businesses, they can
allocate funds to new business ventures that may have been saved to pay for an
adverse judgment.108
A further testament that the Hall Street decision is correct rests on the fact
that arbitration is private, while litigation is not. Parties are able to resolve their
dispute without subjecting themselves to the scrutiny of the public forum.109 This
is especially important if the parties are businesses. Businesses who are involved
in trials that in rare instances become public spectacles risk alienating consumers
and tarnishing their reputations.110 Arbitration allows these businesses—and
their management—to discretely resolve a dispute, thereby limiting information
released to the public.111
A fundamental problem with judicial review on the whole is that judges have
the opportunity to second guess arbitrators who are experts in their ﬁelds.112 When
chosen for their expertise, arbitrators bring with them knowledge of customs and
standards speciﬁc to the ﬁeld at issue.113 In a world that operates on increasingly
specialized and technical language, expert arbitrators have become a necessity.114
More often that not, judges are not equipped with knowledge regarding
engineering or construction, for example.115 However, an alternate holding in
Hall Street would make these experts subservient to judges who do not possess the
equivalent knowledge necessary to reach the best possible conclusion.116
Not to be ignored is the ﬁnality and certainty arbitration was designed to
provide. One of the many goals of the FAA was to see that arbitration awards
were ﬁnal by protecting them from judicial interference.117 The FAA provides that

clerk fees. Id. Private arbitration comes at no cost to the public, thus, parties should expect a savings
by eliminating the court fees. Id.; see also Wharton Poor, Arbitration Under the Federal Statute, 36
YALE L.J. 667, 676 (1927) (explaining a case which goes to trial may be prolonged by multiple
appeals and reversals, ultimately resulting in costs exceeding the amount in dispute).
107

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995).

108

Sarpy, supra note 103, at 189.

109

See Nickolas J. McGrath, McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.: Treatment of a
Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending an Arbitrability Appeal, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 793, 794 (2006).
110

Sarpy, supra note 103, at 189.

111

See Schmitz, supra note 26, at 158.

112

See id. at 161–62.

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

See Gregg A. Paradise, Arbitration of Patent Infringement Disputes: Encouraging the Use of
Arbitration Through Evidence Rules Reform, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 254–55 (1995).
117

Rivkin & Tuchmann, supra note 93, at 538.
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arbitrators will conduct the arbitration and weigh the merits of the case; courts
will only step in to review the case when necessary according to §§ 9 through
11.118 Moreover, the statute’s inﬂexible language, which declares a court “must”
conﬁrm an award unless grounds for vacatur or modiﬁcation are established in
§§ 10 and 11, is a testament that arbitration awards were to be ﬁnal.119 Finally,
arbitration has been described as an act which “settle[s] or end[s] disputes through
ﬁnal and binding third party determinations.”120 This distinguished arbitration as
a separate process, not a mere prologue to litigation.

The Correct Decision in Light of Legislative History
The beneﬁts of arbitration listed above are buttressed by the legislative history
of the FAA. The FAA’s drafters modeled it on sections of the New York Arbitration
Act.121 Julius Cohen was the principle drafter of both the New York Act and the
FAA.122 In 1924, during congressional hearings evaluating national adoption of
the FAA, Cohen noted under the New York Act, courts vehemently supported
arbitrators and the decisions they rendered.123 Supporting the arbitrator also meant
limiting judicial interference in the process.124 Because Congress lifted sections of
the FAA from the New York Act, it is logical that the meaning and purpose of the
act transferred as well.125 Thus, ﬁnality is an inherent goal of the FAA.126 Cohen
went on to express pride in participating in the FAA drafting, because it was a
means to make “the commercial world less expensive and more expeditious.”127
Cohen’s statements taken together with the known tenets of the New York Act

118
Id. (noting arbitrators are in charge of resolving the controversy, whereas, courts are only
responsible for enforcing the ﬁnal award).
119

Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2000)).

120

Schmitz, supra note 26, at 125.

121

King, supra note 37, at 955.

122

Respondent, supra note 2, at 29.

123

Id. at 31 (“[Courts had] given the strongest support to the powers of the arbitrators
thereunder and to the ﬁnality of their awards, and [had] refused to permit the invasion of
technicalities in the application of the [Act] or the determination of rights under it.” (quoting
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the
Senate and House Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 10, 40 (1924) [hereinafter
1924 Hearings])).
124

See id. at 31–32.

125

Id. at 31 (“In using the language of the New York Arbitration Act, Congress intended to
adopt the settled meaning those terms had already acquired.”); see Perkins v. Berger, 145 F.2d 856,
857 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (noting when Congress adopts a state statute, prior interpretation of that
statute transfers as well); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hoage, 85 F.2d 411, 413 (D.C. Cir.
1936) (clarifying when Congress borrows language from a state statute, the state’s construction and
understanding of that statute are deemed to transfer with the statute’s text).
126

See King, supra note 37, at 948.

127

1924 Hearings, supra note 123, at 10, 13.
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demonstrate Congress purposely chose the New York Act as a model to protect
arbitration’s beneﬁts by preventing expanded judicial review.128
The Supreme Court correctly decided Hall Street because any other
conclusion would ignore history, as well as undermine the time-honored beneﬁts
of arbitration.129 Expanded review would cost more, take longer, burden courts
and arbitrators, call ﬁnality into question, expose private matters to public
scrutiny, and take the decision out of the most qualiﬁed hands.130 Fortunately,
the Supreme Court reached the correct conclusion and recognized an alternate
holding would destroy all the FAA drafters helped create.

Expanding Review Despite the Hall Street Decision
The Hall Street decision is correct on the whole, and ostensibly stands for the
proposition that expanded judicial review of arbitration awards, outside the FAA,
is forbidden.131 The Court, however, did not completely exclude opportunities
to add nonstatutory grounds for review.132 In what appears to be a moment of
inconsistency, the Court declared, “we do not purport to say that [§§ 10 and
11] exclude more searching review based on authority outside the statute as
well.”133 This fortuitous statement may be an opening which practitioners can
slip nonstatutory grounds for review through in order to give their clients one
more layer of protection.134
One of the ﬁrst nonstatutory grounds to be considered is the enigmatic
“manifest disregard” of the law.135 Hall Street attempted to prove manifest disregard
of the law was a viable standard of review based on Wilko.136 While Hall Street
has come to represent the demise of nonstatutory standards of review in general,
the Court was forced to address manifest disregard speciﬁcally in response to
Hall Street’s argument.137 Instead of eliminating the standard, the Court declared
manifest disregard was merely a reference to review exceptions in FAA § 10.138
128

See Respondent, supra note 2, at 32–33 (quoting 1924 Hearings, supra note 123, at 34).

129

See Rivkin & Tuchmann, supra note 93, at 537. For those who agree with limited review
there is evidence that the international trend has also been in this direction. International Business,
supra note 30, at 21–28.
130

See supra notes 95–120 and accompanying text.

131

See Rau, supra note 17, at 502–03.

132

Id. at 502–06.

133

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1406.

134

Rau, supra note 17, at 502–06.

135

Polenberg & Smith, supra note 18, at 36.

136

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1403.

137

Id. at 1403–04

138

Id. at 1404 (“Maybe the term ‘manifest disregard’ was meant to name a new ground for
review, but maybe it merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them.”).
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By addressing and dismissing manifest disregard speciﬁcally, it would seem the
issue should be resolved; however, confusion about the standard’s existence has
survived.139 Courts have avoided discussing whether manifest disregard is still
viable in light of Hall Street, instead of unequivocally declaring that the standard
is no longer an option for review.140 However, within this confusion there may still
exist an opportunity to use the standard.
In Vaughn v. Leeds, Morelli & Brown, P.C., the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit recognized that although the Hall Street decision severely
limits the grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards, manifest disregard of
the law is still a viable option.141 The Second Circuit even goes so far as to provide
a three-part test for courts to use in deciding whether an arbitrator’s decision is in
manifest disregard of the law.142 The Supreme Court’s choice in Hall Street not to
unequivocally exclude review standards outside of the FAA has allowed manifest
disregard to be resurrected after its apparent demise.143
The Vaughn court is not alone in its decision to continue to acknowledge the
manifest disregard standard. Wisconsin courts have since kept the standard as well.
In Sands v. Menard, Inc., the court noted it was content with its conclusion that
manifest disregard remained viable due to the Supreme Court’s declaration that

139
Robert Ellis, Imperfect Minimalism: Unanswered Questions in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C.
v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008), 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187, 1192–93 (2009).
140
See Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 (1st Cir. 2008) (declining
to decide whether Hall Street precludes use of manifest disregard because the parties’ claim did not
invoke FAA review); Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. NL Indus. Inc., 306 F. App’x 843, 843 (5th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (refusing to decide whether manifest disregard survived Hall Street because
the plaintiffs would not meet the burden even if it still existed); Franko v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs.,
Inc., No. 09-09, 2009 WL 1636054, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2009) (noting the parties would
not meet the manifest disregard burden and, as a result, there is no need to examine whether the
standard remains valid in light of the Hall Street decision).
141

315 F. App’x 327, 330 (2d Cir. 2009).

142

Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l. Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2008). The Second
Circuit explained the test as follows:
First, we must consider whether the law that was allegedly ignored was clear, and
in fact explicitly applicable to the matter before the arbitrators. . . . Second, once it
is determined that the law is clear and plainly applicable, we must ﬁnd that the law
was in fact improperly applied, leading to an erroneous outcome. . . . Third, once
the ﬁrst two inquiries are satisﬁed, we look to a subjective element, that is, the
knowledge actually possessed by the arbitrators. In order to intentionally disregard
the law, the arbitrator must have known of its existence, and its applicability to
the problem before him.
Id. (citation omitted).
143
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 2009). But
see Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 355–58 (5th Cir. 2009) (disagreeing
with other federal circuit courts’ continued acceptance of manifest disregard as a valid standard or
review).
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“the FAA is not the only way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration
awards.”144 The Sands court used this language as an example of the Supreme
Court’s willingness to let state courts expand beyond the FAA.145
Another possible nonstatutory ground for vacatur is the “public policy
exception.”146 The resilience of this standard of review may be related to its
historical presence and value to courts.147 Preceding Hall Street, courts were
willing to enforce arbitration agreements that allowed vacatur if the award violated
deﬁned public policy.148 Courts may still accept public policy as a viable standard
of review for arbitration awards because public policy is dissimilar to other review
standards.149 The difference is challenging an award on public policy grounds does
not require a review of the merits of the case.150 A court can simply defer to the
arbitrator’s method for reaching the decision and come to a conclusion.151 This
should alleviate any concern that expanded review will undermine arbitration’s
efﬁciency. Additionally, public policy has an established history in the law and
would be difﬁcult to supplant.152 At least one court, the United States District
144

767 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1406).
Some courts have also been willing to expand review on their own volition, using manifest disregard
as a judicially created exception to the rule that review is limited to §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA. See
DMA Int’l, Inc. v. Qwest Commc’ns Intern., No. 08-CV-00358-WDM-BNB, 2008 WL 4216261,
at *4–5 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2008) (implying a distinction between private agreements to expand
review and judicially created grounds for vacatur may not have eliminated judicial expansion for
review of arbitration awards).
145

See Sands, 767 N.W.2d at 335.

Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur after Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV.
1103, 1106–07 (2009).
146

147

See Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Crumbled Difference Between Legal and Illegal Arbitration
Awards: Hall Street Associates and the Waning Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 597, 615 (2009) (“[F]ederal courts began using the public policy exception as an extra-statutory
basis for vacatur under the FAA, reasoning the public policy exception was inherent in all contracts,
and arbitrations were essentially dispute mechanisms generated by contract.”). But see Stuart M.
Widman, Hall Street v. Mattel The Supreme Court’s Alternative Arbitration Universes, DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Fall 2008, at 24, 27 (implying Hall Street signals the end for nonstatutory review standards,
including review for violation of public policy).
148
Aaron S. Bayer & Joseph M. Gillis, Signiﬁcant Questions, Little Guidance Arbitration After
Hall Street, FOR THE DEF., Nov. 2008, at 44, 48 (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987)); Murray, supra note 1, at 652.
149

Bayer & Gillis, supra note 148, at 48.

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Id. (“Courts have long refrained from enforcing, and thereby putting the State’s imprimatur
on, contracts that violate important public policies.”); see also Rau, supra note 17, at 501–02.
Appalled at the Court’s failure to declare public policy as a necessary exception to the holding,
commentator Rau noted:
Since externalities—negative social effects—necessarily limit every exercise of
contractual autonomy, vacatur for violation of “public policy” is a necessary fail
safe, universally understood in every existing legal system as a ground (whether
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Court for the District of Massachusetts, has recognized a public policy exception,
even though it declined to address whether Hall Street precluded the manifest
disregard standard.153 This post-Hall Street decision may prove useful to those
trying to vacate an arbitration award using grounds for review outside the FAA.
The “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review has also been called into
question by Hall Street.154 Because it is a nonstatutory ground for review, apparently
it has been abolished like many others by Hall Street.155 However, on one occasion
a court examined the possibility of vacating an award under this standard.156 The
court acknowledged Hall Street brought into question whether the standard still
existed, but nevertheless decided to examine the dispute using the arbitrary and
capricious standard because that is what the parties contracted for.157 While this
standard does seem less likely to be a viable option, parties should at least consider
it.

A Saving Grace for the Hesitant
A tactic noted by some commentators is to parallel a contract-based grounds
for review with one present in the FAA.158 The theory proposes, the more a party’s
contract-based grounds for review appear to merely be a unique way of expressing
an FAA standard, the greater the chance of court acceptance.159 There is at least
some evidence to support this theory. In Franko v. Ameriprise Financial Services
Inc., the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

“statutory” or “non statutory”) for refusing to honor an award. However rarely
successful, it must somehow be made to ﬁt within the architecture of our law of
arbitration.
Id.
153
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, No. 08-cv-11945-DPW, 2009 WL
2425798, at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 5, 2009). The court traced public policy’s validity as a standard of
review to the common law principle that courts do not have to enforce illegal contracts. Id. Public
policy allows the award to be vacated if it violated excepted public policy standards, which should
be determined by prevailing laws and precedents. Id.
154

Widman, supra note 147, at 27.

155

Polenberg & Smith, supra note 18, at 36.

156

See Waddell v. Holiday Isle, No. 09-0040-WS-M, 2009 WL 2413668, at *11 (S.D. Ala.
Aug. 4, 2009); see also Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 431 F.3d 1320, 1326
(11th Cir. 2005).
157

Waddell, 2009 WL 2413668, at *11.

158

See Bayer & Gillis, supra note 148, at 49; Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 859 N.Y.S.2d
342, 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (declaring so long as the public policy exception is merely a court’s
interpretation of § 10(a)(4) of the FAA it would survive Hall Street so long as a party did not claim
it was a nonstatutory standard of review).
159
Bayer & Gillis, supra note 148, at 49. The statutory requirement that arbitrators not exceed
their power may be broad enough to encompass many nonstatutory standards. Id.
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noted the previously discussed “manifest disregard” of the law standard closely
mirrors § 10 of the FAA allowing a court to vacate the award if an arbitrator
exceeded his or her powers.160 Moreover, standards allowing review when the
arbitrator “fails to draw [his or her decision from the] essence” of the contract is
also similar to § 10 because arbitrators are bound by the contract.161 Therefore, if
nonstatutory grounds for review are close enough in purpose to statutory grounds
for review, it may survive the Hall Street limitation.
Another option may be to use state law to avoid the Hall Street decision. In
Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., the California Supreme Court recognized
that Hall Street left a loophole allowing a state court to use state law to expand
judicial review.162 This loophole was of course the Supreme Court’s reference to
allowing a “more searching review [for expanded judicial review] based on authority
outside the statute.”163 The contract in Cable Connection provided: “The arbitrators
shall not have the power to commit errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award
may be vacated or corrected on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for
any such error.”164 The court concluded that Hall Street only restricted arbitration
under the FAA and does not preempt state arbitration statutes allowing expanded
review.165 The court rationalized its decision by noting the intention of the FAA
is to see that private parties’ arbitration agreements are enforced.166 Thus, so long
as the parties’ valid arbitration agreement is being enforced in accordance with
FAA policy, the court felt free to use the state’s arbitration act and allow expanded
judicial review.167

Alternatives to Nonstatutory Review Standards
Parties can always attempt to protect themselves by carefully deﬁning the
arbitration process in the agreement.168 Parties are free to decide how arbitrators
are selected, what issues can be arbitrated, and even what qualiﬁcations an
160

Franko, 2009 WL 1636054, at *4; see also Comedy Club, 553 F.3d at 1290; Stolt-Nielson,
548 F.3d at 94 (noting manifest disregard is “a judicial gloss on the speciﬁc grounds for vacatur
enumerated in § 10 of the FAA”).
161

Bayer & Gillis, supra note 148, at 49.

162

190 P.3d 586, 596 (Cal. 2008).

163

Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1406.

164

Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 590.

165

Id. at 599.

166

Id. The FAA policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements was meant to stem the
tide of judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements but was never meant to sanction expanded
judicial review. See Schmitz, supra note 26, at 144–45.
167

Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 599. The court believed so long as FAA policy was being
met, there was no need to make state arbitration statutes conform, especially in light of the Court’s
recognition of grounds for review based on state law. See id. at 598–99.
168

See Rivkin & Tuchmann, supra note 93, at 540–41 (explaining the Hall Street decision only
limited subsequent review of arbitration awards, not the procedures used to conduct arbitration).
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arbitrator must possess.169 This freedom, of course, comes with the caveat that
parties are free to deﬁne arbitration procedure but not judicial review, except for
very limited circumstances as addressed above.170
If parties are set on contracting for expanded review of the award, and fear
using nonstatutory grounds for judicial review, then contracting for review by
an appellate arbitration panel is a viable option.171 Appellate arbitration services,
such as the American Arbitration Association, allow parties to contract for a panel
of arbitrators to review the award using standards of review to which the parties
agree.172 These can even include review for “manifest disregard of the law or facts,”
“clear errors of law,” and “because of clear and convincing factual errors.”173 If
parties wish to have an element of the judiciary present they can also place a
retired judge on the panel.174
While at ﬁrst glance it may appear that Hall Street has eliminated all grounds
for judicial review of arbitration awards, clever drafters in courts sympathetic to
expanded review may be able to go beyond the FAA in order to seek favorable
terms for their clients. Some courts still recognize manifest disregard of the law, as
well as the public policy exception.175 Moreover, carefully drafting the procedure
used during arbitration and allowing for review by an appellate arbitration panel
may provide the safeguards that have in many ways been taken away by Hall
Street.

CONCLUSION
On the whole, the United States Supreme Court correctly decided Hall
Street by limiting review of arbitration awards to circumstances present within
the FAA.176 It recognized allowing expanded judicial review would place undue
pressure on arbitrators and courts alike, as well as undermine the qualities that

169
4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 17 (2009); see also Smit, supra note 95, at 150
(“[P]arties have a large measure of freedom to shape the arbitration in the way they see ﬁt.”).
170

See supra notes 131–67 and accompanying text.

171

See Rivkin & Tuchmann, supra note 93, at 542–43; see also Poor, supra note 106, at 676
(concluding if parties are unwilling to accept an arbitrator’s decision it is within their power to agree
for review by an appeal board).
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 37 (2007); see also THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, ARBITRATION APPEAL PROCEDURE (2007), http://www.cpradr.org/ArbitrationAppeal
Procedure/tabid/79/Default.aspx.
172

173

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 172, at 37.

Respondent, supra note 2, at 48 (citing IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J.
STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 27.2.3, at 27:4–7 (1995)).
174

175

See supra notes 135–53 and accompanying test.

176

See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
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make arbitration an actual alternative to traditional litigation.177 However, while
the decision was correct, it is not as decisive as it may appear.178 Grounds for
review still exist, in some courts, outside of the statute in the forms of manifest
disregard, public policy, state law, and possibly arbitrary and capricious.179 If
parties fear challenging Hall Street or believe courts in their jurisdictions are
hostile to nonstatutory review standards, then carefully tailoring the arbitration
agreement and allowing for review by an appellate arbitration panel may give
parties the protective review parachute purportedly taken away by Hall Street.180

177

See supra notes 95–130 and accompanying text.

178

See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.

179

See supra notes 131–67 and accompanying text.

180

See supra notes 168–74 and accompanying text.
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